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I. Introduction
When one thinks of hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing
the violence of armed militias, of internally displaced persons who
suffer from starvation, extreme poverty, and re-victimization at the
hands of those who prey upon vulnerable populations, the first
country to come to mind might be Sudan.1 Although the crisis in
Darfur has received the lion's share of media attention, this
description fits not only the distant land in Africa, but it also fits a
country much closer to home, right here in the Americas.
Colombia is second only to Sudan in numbers of internally
displaced persons, creating a refugee crisis that has grown in
severity in recent years.2 Those lucky enough to be able to leave
Colombia in search of protection in the United States face an
asylum system that fails to recognize the reality of today's
refugee. Instead of fleeing a government that overtly engages in
the persecution of its population, today's refugee is more often
fleeing violence perpetrated by non-state actors. Yet, "[d]espite
broad recognition of abuses attributable to non-state agents,
internal conflict, and failed states, international human rights law
is scrambling to keep up with the changing context of repression,
persecution, and brutality throughout the world."4  This new
reality has led to a divergence in asylum theory.
In evaluating the Colombian asylum crisis, one must first
understand the two competing theories that frame asylum law; as
I See generally OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, STATE OF
THE WORLD'S REFUGEES CH. 7 (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2006), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/4444d3ce2.html (discussing the current crisis situation
in the Darfur region of Sudan).
2 See Global Statistics, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, available at
http://www.internal-displacement.org (follow "Countries" tab; then follow "statistics"
link). But see 2006 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally
Displaced and Stateless Persons, Table 1, revised July 16, 2007, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/4676a71d4.pdf (placing Colombia first,
Iraq second, and Sudan third in its estimates of internally displaced persons). One reason
for the discrepancy in numbers is that the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre uses
the Colombian government's official estimates, which dramatically downplays the
severity of the problem. Id. at 13.
3 See Jennifer Moore, From Nation State to Failed State: International Protection
from Human Rights Abuses by Non-State Agents, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 81, 85
(1999).
4 Id. at 86.
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either a humanitarian concept, or as a political concept.5
Advocates of the humanitarian view would argue that "those
forced to flee their homelands because they lack protection from
generalized violence or severe economic hardship have as strong a
moral claim to asylum as people targeted for violence by their
state."6 This view would advocate for widening the definition of
asylum to focus on the asylum seekers' need for protection, and
not on the causes of their plight.' Humanitarians argue that the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees8 was
developed for a different political reality, and that a new theory of
asylum that more readily recognizes insurgencies and non-state
actors as perpetrators of persecutory violence (even if seemingly
indiscriminate) is necessary. 9 The humanitarian construct has
been formally adopted in some regions where civil war and
widespread violence required a new approach to asylum law. 1
5 See generally Matthew E. Price, Persecution Complex: Justifying Asylum Law's
Preference for Persecuted People, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 413 (2006) (describing the
"persecution complex" in terms of a humanitarian or political concept); Tahl Tyson,
Comment, The Refugee Act of 1980: Suggested Reforms in the Overseas Refugee
Program to Safeguard Humanitarian Concerns From Competing Interests, 65 WASH. L.
REV. 921, 929-30 (1990) (arguing that competing interests of foreign policy, special
interest group pressure, and domestic concerns override what should be the primary
concern: humanitarian goals).
6 Price, supra note 5, at 417-18.
7 Id. at421.
8 See generally Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150, available at http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf
(delineating U.N. protocol in relation to refugees).
9 Price, supra note 5, at 419-21. See also Laura Isabel Bauer, They Beg For Our
Protection and We Refuse: U.S. Asylum Law's Failure to Protect Many of Today's
Refugees, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081, 1087-88 (2004).
10 See Won Kidane, Article: An Injury to the Citizen, a Pleasure to the State: A
Peculiar Challenge to the Enforcement of International Refugee Law, 6 CHI-KENT J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 116, 125 (2006), available at http://www.kentlaw.edu/jicl/article/
spring2006/s2006 WonKidane.pdf. The Organization of African Unity (OAU)
expanded the definition of refugee under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol to
include "any person outside of his country 'owing to external aggression, occupation,
foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order."' Id. at 125 (citing
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, art. 1, Sep.
10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45). The Organization of American States adopted a similar
definition in the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees. See Organization of American
States (OAS), Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, at 111.3, OAS
Doc.OEA/Ser.L/V/ll.66/doc.10 (Nov. 22, 1984), available at
2008]
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The political conception of asylum, which requires the
persecution criterion and judges "the legitimacy of, and the state's
culpability in, the asylum seeker's exposure to harm"" generally
supports the status quo and rejects expansion of asylum under the
aforementioned humanitarian law principles. 2  The primary
support for preserving the political concept of asylum comes from
the perception that asylum is an expressive practice, as "it reflects
a judgment that the asylum seeker was being abused, not merely
that she was suffering."13  Providing asylum to a citizen of a
sovereign state intervenes in the internal relationship a nation has
with its citizen, and expresses "condemnation of the asylum
seeker's state of origin."' 4
Those who frame the asylum question in political terms would
argue that in this respect, asylum is qualitatively different from
refugee status, in that other forms of foreign assistance can be
offered to refugees.15 Persecuted refugees in camps abroad can
still be referred to the U.S. for asylum. Other refugees who are
suffering as a result of natural disaster, generalized violence or
armed conflict, and those suffering severe economic hardship such
as starvation would still have access to "in situ aid [in the form of]
temporary protection, military intervention, and overseas
resettlement programs."16 While a full exploration of these
competing theories is beyond the scope of this paper, 7 assume for
http://www.oas.org/dil/1984_CartagenaDeclaration-on-Refugees.pdf. See also KAREN
MUSALO, JENNIFER MOORE & RICHARD A. BOSWELL, Contemporary and Expanded
Notions of the Refugee, in REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY, 45-56 (1997).
II Price, supra note 5, at 418 (emphasis in original).
12 See id. at 423-424.
13 Id. at 425 (emphasis in original).
14 Id. (further arguing that a state "deserves condemnation for being unwilling to
protect its citizens; it does not deserve condemnation for being unable to do so." Id. at
460.). Where the Colombian government would fall on this continuum is a matter of
considerable debate.
15 Id. at 426.
16 Id. Temporary protection is described as refugee camps in safe areas or border
countries. Id. Overseas resettlement programs under the political conception would
include forms of relief such as Temporary Protected Status and Withholding of Removal,
which are temporary in nature and stop short of asylum, which grants membership in the
third country in the form of permanent residence. Id.
17 For further discussion related to these theories, see David Cole, The Idea of
Humanity: Human Rights and Immigrants' Rights, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 627
[Vol. XXXIII
2008] THE COLOMBIAN CRISIS IN CONTEXT
the purpose of this discussion that advocates of the political
conception (more or less the status quo) are right. Accepting this
argument means that 1) asylum is a special expressive practice that
must be preserved as a separate entity; 8 2) that the persecuted
represent the highest moral obligation of receiving countries, even
if their danger is not as imminent as some other forced migrants"
and 3) that the 1951 Convention is still relevant in today's
geopolitical reality. 2° The question then becomes: has the United
States so narrowed its reading of the definition of refugee under
the Convention that, as a matter of practice, it has made the
Convention irrelevant in addressing victims of non-state actors and
those fleeing civil war?
21
Using Colombia as an example, this comment will address this
question. It is important to note that while this comment focuses
on Colombia, it is applicable to any region where generalized
violence, terrorism, civil war, and government impotency combine
(2006) (addressing immigrants' rights generally through appealing to international
human rights, calling for self-executing human rights laws to give them force in the
immigration context); James C. Hathaway, Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights
Protection, 4 J. REFUGEE STUD. 113 (1991) (introducing a formal humanitarian concept
of refugee law); Inna Nazarova, Comment, Alienating "Human "from "Right": U.S. and
UK Non-Compliance with Asylum Obligations Under International Human Rights Law,
25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1335 (2002) (arguing that post-9/11 restrictions on asylum
should not interfere with the humanitarian principles that united the world after World
War II); Daniel J. Steinbock, The Qualities of Mercy: Maximizing the Impact of U.S.
Refugee Resettlement, 36 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 951 (2003) (addressing tension of
competing theories for determining who should benefit from the refugee resettlement
program).
18 See Price, supra note 5, at 443-44.
19 See id. at 465 (noting however that while the persecuted have the highest moral
claim to asylum, "they may not have the strongest claim to assistance," advocating for a
blend of temporary protection and in situ aid).
20 Joan Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention, 9 HARV. HUM. RTs.
J. 229, 231 (1996).
21 Joan Fitzpatrick, Temporary Protection of Refugees: Elements of a Formalized
Regime, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 279, 292-93 (2000). Ways in which states with high asylum
caseloads have narrowed the definition of refugee especially as related to victims of
internal armed conflict include "holding that violence associated with armed conflict is
generalized and nonpersecutory; that only asylum applicants who are individually
singled out fall within that definition; that harm threatened against an individual by
government forces to overcome perceived opposition during internal armed conflict or
civil strife is not motivated by persecutory animus; and that only government agents are
legally capable of engaging in persecution." Id. at 292-93.
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to create a mass forced migration. This comment first provides
necessary context by giving the reader an overview of the complex
historical conditions that have led to the current crisis in
Colombia, covering in-depth the actors in this violent struggle that
have displaced thousands of innocent victims.22 The second
section introduces the asylum system in the United States as it has
interpreted its obligations under the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol. The focus will be on how these interpretations have
impacted Colombian asylum-seekers using specific case analysis,
which highlights the challenges in establishing asylum that
Colombian nationals face under the current construct. Finally, the
comment proposes possible solutions that have broad applicability
not only to victims of internal violence and civil wars in
Colombia, but to all similarly situated persons.
II. History and Current Country Conditions
A. Origins of the Conflict: Early Political Turmoil
The current crisis in Colombia dates back to the 1960s when
the first leftist guerrilla groups were organized for the primary
purpose of establishing economic and social justice through land
reform.23 However, the root of the conflict goes back to the
country's founding in the 1820s, and grew out of the ongoing
power struggle between the Conservative and Liberal Parties that
reflects the social stratification that plagues Colombia to this day. 4
The Conservative party draws its support from the upper strata of
Colombian society, "namely the affluent cosmopolitan elite, the
absentee owners of vast landholdings, mining operations,
plantations and ranches, [and] the ruling 'patrician' families in
22 Practitioners who ignore or mischaracterize this context do so at their client's
peril. Asylum cases are incredibly dependent on the facts not only of what happened to
the individual seeking asylum, but also to the country conditions in the specific
geographic area inside the country of origin. See generally Luz E. Nagle, Colombian
Asylum Seekers: What Practitioners Should Know About the Colombian Crisis, 18 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 441 (2004) (giving background information about the turmoil in Colombia
and the factors that should lead to asylum status being granted).
23 See Arturo Carrillo-Suarez, Hors de Logique: Contemporary Issues in
International Humanitarian Law as Applied to Internal Armed Conflict, 15 AM. U. INT'L
L. REV. 1, 10 (1999).
24 See id. at 10; Nagle, supra note 22, at 444.
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rural areas."25 There is also a racial element to this alignment,
where most members of this social group can trace their ancestry
directly to Spain.2 6 "[T]oday one's name and bloodlines are of
paramount importance among the families of the traditional
elite. 27 In contrast, the Liberal Party represents merchants, the
working class, rural farmers, and leftist reformers, who often
identify with the indigenous people of the region. 28  The first
workers' unions grew out of this party, and when communism
gained in popularity, a more radical leftist wing of the party
emerged.29
The struggle for power grew violent in the late 1940s and
1950s, in a period known as 'la Violencia', which greatly
intensified after the assassination of the charismatic leader of the
Liberal Party, Jorge Eli6cer Gaitdn on April 9, 1948.30 While
estimates to the number of deaths during this period vary, numbers
range from 80,000 to as many as 400,000. 3 1 A military coup by
General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in June 1953 was the result of
divisions within the ruling Conservative Party, and was initially
designed to put an end to the violence that had swept throughout
the country.32 While initially successful in quelling the violence, it
soon returned, and when Rojas Pinilla showed no signs of
returning to democratic rule, the Liberal Party and members of the
Conservative Party attempted to remove him from power.33 This
controversy resulted in a power sharing agreement between the
Liberal and Conservative Parties known as the National Front,
established in 1958."4 The agreement provided that the presidency
25 Nagle, supra note 22, at 444.
26 See id.
27 Id. at 444-45 (describing Colombia's highly class conscious society as "caste-
like" in its intensity).
28 See id. at 445.
29 See id.
30 John C. Dugas, Colombia, in POLITICS OF LATIN AMERICA: THE POWER GAME
497, 506 (Harry E. Vanden & Gary Prevost eds., 2006).
31 FRANK SAFFORD & MARCO PALACIOS, COLOMBIA: FRAGMENTED LAND, DIVIDED
SOCIETY 345 (2002).
32 See Dugas, supra note 30, at 507.
33 See id.
34 See id. at 507-08.
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would alternate between the two parties every four years during
the sixteen year period the agreement covered.35  "It created a
political regime that was civilian in character but not particularly
democratic in nature."36  Third parties were prohibited, and
socialist organizations and other leftist groups were shut out of the
process.37  Although the National Front ended the partisan
conflicts of la Violencia, more militant groups evolved in response
to their disenfranchisement from the political process, leading to
an upsurge in other sources of violent conflict.38 Though many
groups have come and gone, the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia, or FARC) and the Ejercito Nacional de Liberacion
(National Liberation Army, or ELN) have survived to this day, and
are the most enduring guerrilla organizations in the Americas.39
B. "Los Guerrilleros ": The FARC and ELN
"The FARC guerrillas are the oldest, largest, and strongest
guerrilla movement in Colombia."4  Originally guided by
agrarian-communist ideology, the FARC's origins rose out of the
peasantry, and it has supported land reform in order to create a
society of small property owners and to improve the conditions for
agricultural workers.41 Though initially organized loosely as self-
defense units, the guerillas became decidedly more cohesive and
aggressive in 1964 after the Colombian military, assisted by the
United States government, attacked five communist-held
municipalities. 42  Although the attack was successful in military
terms, it had the effect of reinforcing popular support for the group
35 See id. at 508.
36 Id.
37 See Nagle, supra note 22, at 446.
38 See id.; Dugas, supra note 30, at 508.
39 See Nagle, supra note 22, at 446.
40 Carrillo-Suarez, supra note 23, at 13.
41 SAFFORD & PALACIOS, supra note 31, at 354.
42 See STEVEN DUDLEY, WALKING GHOSTS: MURDER AND GUERRILLA POLITICS IN
COLOMBIA 9-10 (2004) (arguing further that modem U.S. Colombia relations were
shaped by this first U.S. intervention in the spread of communism in the Americas at the
height of the Cold War).
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that would emerge as the FARC two years later.43
Heavily influenced by the Cuban revolution, the Communist
Party in Colombia advocated a policy of advancing their agenda
through a "combinaci6n de todas formas de lucha"; in other
words, the party advocated the use of violence for political gain
while at the same time pursued change through legitimate political
channels." In the 1980s, after a peace agreement with the
government recognized the FARC as political protagonists, the
FARC split from the Communist Party and formed their own
political party, the Uni6n Patri6tica or UP.4 Although there was
great hope that a legitimate political party would allow the leftist
guerrillas the opportunity to lay down their arms, shortly after the
party was formed, its members were murdered by paramilitaries
and Colombian security forces, effectively exterminating the party
and providing the only excuse the FARC needed to continue their
violent struggle indefinitely.46 Although other political parties
have tried to fill the void, they continue to be easy targets for those
that seek to limit the democratic left.47
The rise of narcotics processing and trafficking in Colombia
has blurred the lines between what once made the FARC
revolutionaries instead of merely petty criminals. 48  The fall of
communism has contributed to the sentiment that the FARC has
all but abandoned their political and social ideology in favor of
43 See id. at 10.
44 See id. See also MARIA CLEMENCIA RAMIREZ, ENTRE EL ESTADO Y LA
GUERRILLA: IDENTIDAD Y CIUDADANIA EN EL MOVIMIENTO DE LOS CAMPESINOS
COCALEROS DEL PUTUMAYO 70 (2001).
45 DUDLEY, supra note 42, at 10 (comparing UP to the Palestinian Liberation
Organization or Sinn Fein as the political arm of armed insurgent groups); SAFFORD &
PALACIOS, supra note 31, at 356.
46 See DUDLEY, supra note 42, at xvii (documenting the rise and fall of the Union
Patriotica through in-depth interviews with surviving members of the party, the FARC,
and other protagonists in the demise of the party).
47 See id. at 175-78 The first to follow the UP was the Bolivarian Movement, a
clandestine political party under the 'protection' of the FARC, likened to "martyrs in the
making," a future sacrificial lamb in the FARC's efforts towards political dominance. Id.
at 209-16. The Frente Social y Politico followed. One of their candidates for Congress,
Wilson Borja, survived one assassination attempt in 2000 prior to his election in 2002
and still travels with a large security detail. Id.
48 See RAMIREZ, supra note 44, at 66.
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military and economic motives.49  Though they fund their
operations with money obtained through kidnapping, extortion,
and "taxing" the cultivation and processing of narcotics in FARC-
controlled areas,5" it would be overly simplistic to say the FARC
are now 'narco-guerrillas' without a political agenda.5 Organized
militarily, the FARC are estimated to have anywhere from 10,000
to 15,000 troops.5 2  Although their dominance has dwindled in
recent years, they still operate multiple fronts and their presence is
felt in all regions of the country, particularly in the south.53
Although the ELN is the smaller of the two guerrilla groups,
they still number 5,000 members strong. Founded in 1964 by
university students strongly influenced by the Cuban revolution,
the ELN seems to have held onto its ideological roots, at least in
theory.54 Its area of influence lies in the northern departments of
Colombia near the Venezuelan border, where it funds its
operations primarily through extortion and kidnapping.55  A
particularly lucrative practice has been to "extort protection money
from multinational corporations involved in the extraction and
49 See UNHCR, International Protection Considerations Regarding Colombian
Asylum-Seekers and Refugees, 15 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 318, 322 (2003) (from 2002
UNHCR report, available at http://www.unhcr.org/publ/RSDLEGAL/3d92d4204.pdf)
[hereinafter UNHCR (2003)].
50 See id.; DUDLEY, supra note 42, at 217 (estimating that these FARC activities
bring in about $700 million (U.S.) every year).
51 See generally Jorge L. Esquirol, Can International Law Help? An Analysis of
the Colombian Peace Process, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 23, 30 (2000) (arguing that although
the end of the Cold War has diluted their ideology, the FARCs political pronouncements
for a "New Colombia" are based on "principles of social justice and economic self-
determination ... [including] broad political participation, more state control over the
economy, and land redistribution through expropriation.").
52 See Carrillo-Suarez, supra note 23, at 13.
53 See UNHCR, International Protection Considerations Regarding Colombian
Asylum-Seekers and Refugees, 18 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 182, 186 (2006) (2005 UNHCR
report, available at http://www.unhcr.org/publ/RSDLEGAL/422c832e4.pdf) [hereinafter
UNHCR (2006)]; Carrillo-Suarez, supra note 23, at 13.
54 See Esquirol, supra note 51, at 30 (noting the strong liberation theology that
came from their leaders' roots as ex-Catholic priests, who have made appeals to
international humanitarian law and made pronouncements against the drug trade).
However, a more radical faction with fewer ethical qualms has recently gained more
control. Id. at 30-31.
55 See UNHCR (2006), supra note 53, at 187.
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transport of oil, Colombia's principal export."56  When the
companies refuse to pay, the ELN engages in sabotage of the
petroleum infrastructure. However, this funding source has been
affected by state-provided security to the oil industry.57 The
ELN's strength in recent years has abated partially due to the
actions of paramilitary organizations that operate in many of the
areas traditionally held by the ELN.58 It has also made overtures
towards demobilization, and engaged in talks with the Colombian
government in early 2002, but those talks ceased when the ELN
resumed violence.59 Talks resumed again in 2004, but rather than
progressing towards a peaceful resolution, the ELN has moved in
the opposite direction, talking of joining forces with the FARC.60
C. The Paramilitaries: The AUC
The Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense
Groups of Colombia or AUC) was born of diverse origins. Some
of its membership grew out of several private armies that were
organized by wealthy land-owners to protect their interests against
the guerrilla groups. "The paramilitary groups traditionally were-
and continue to be-financed by drug traffickers, large landowners
("hacendados") and cattlemen ("ganaderos")."' Other groups
were born directly from strategies used by Colombian military
leaders to combat the guerrillas, including a 1968 law that
authorized the distribution of weapons to local peasants by the
military to confront the guerrillas, a practice that ended in 1989.62
But in 1994, the Colombian government, overrun by guerrilla
fighting, once again allowed the organization of these private
security services for purposes of self-defense, known as the
"Convivir.' '63 In the early part of the government's war on the
56 Carrillo-Suarez, supra note 23, at 15-16.
57 See UNHCR (2006), supra note 53, at 187.
58 See id.
59 See UNHCR (2003), supra note 49, at 322-23.
60 See UNHCR (2006), supra note 53, at 187.
61 Carrillo-Suarez, supra note 23, at 16. See also UNHCR (2006), supra note 54,
at 187-88.
62 See Dugas, supra note 30, at 512.
63 Luz Estella Nagle, Survey: Solving Problems Facing International Law Today:
Global Terrorism in Our Own Backyard: Colombia's Legal War Against Illegal Armed
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guerrilla movements, paramilitary groups were often used in
advance of the regular forces to clear the area of guerrilla activity,
but they were notoriously indiscriminant, with complete disregard
for the international laws requiring armed forces to distinguish
between combatants and civilians.64
Recognizing that "it had created a monster by legalizing
paramilitary groups" the government attempted to shut down the
groups in 1997, but it was too late.65 Organized in much the same
way as their guerrilla counterparts, the AUC modus operandi is to
attack and kill the guerrillas by targeting their support networks
and any civilian seen as sympathetic to their cause.66 Their
methods are notoriously brutal, and include torture, death threats,
summary executions, and forced disappearances; some estimates
put the percentage of AUC involvement in total human rights
abuses in Colombia as high as seventy percent.6 7 Although the
government has attempted to distance itself from the AUC, the
government security forces continue to be implicated in their
actions, which is further complicated by ongoing judicial
impunity.68 The AUC entered into a demobilization program with
the Colombian government, which the Colombian government
claims to have completed at the end of 2006, with more than
30,000 paramilitaries turning in their arms.69 Aside from further
exacerbating the perceptions of judicial impunity for their
actions,70 many question whether the demobilization process truly
Groups, 15 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 18 (2005) [hereinafter Nagle Survey].
64 See id. at 18-19.
65 Id. at 19.
66 Dugas, supra note 30, at 512.
67 See Esquirol, supra note 51, at 34.
68 See Carrillo-Suarez, supra note 23, at 18 (stating that "[the paramilitary's] links
with the Colombian armed forces are notorious, and the two continue to operate in
frequent coordination"); Nagle Survey, supra note 63, at 19 (noting that investigations
by Colombia Internal Affairs implicated some 59 police and military personnel in human
rights violations when acting alongside members of the paramilitary group MAS
(Muertos al Secuestrados) or 'Death to Kidnappers'). See also Elizabeth F. Schwartz,
Comment, Getting Away With Murder: Social Cleansing in Colombia and the Role of the
United States, 27 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 381 (1995).
69 See Amnesty International Report 2007: Colombia, available at
http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/Regions/Americas/Colombia.
70 See U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Report on the Situation of Human
Rights in Colombia, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/9 (May 16, 2006) (covering the year 2005),
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dismantled the paramilitaries' criminal and financial networks.7'
There continued to be serious breaches of the ceasefire in 2005
and 2006, resulting in executions and other human rights
violations.72 There are also some indications that new paramilitary
groups are being formed.73 In areas where paramilitary groups
have not disbanded, violence has increased.
74
"It should be pointed out that serious violations do not arise
from any deliberate policy on the part of the Government.,
75
However, security forces continue to be implicated in human
rights violations.76 "[T]rustworthy complaints filed in 2005 more
often reported the direct involvement of members of the security
forces. In several cases, the actions of paramilitaries implicated
State responsibility due to action or omission by government
officials. 77  The Center for Popular Research and Education
(CINEP) attributed 92 unlawful killings perpetrated by security
forces in the first six months of 2006. 71 "There continued to be
available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/GO6/123/39/PDF/
G0612339.pdf?OpenElement (stating that "Act No. 782 and its implementing Decree
No. 128 of 2003 ...provides for a number of legal benefits, including pardons, for
demobilized persons"). See also Timothy Posnanski, Centennial Universal Congress of
Lawyers Conference-Lawyers and Jurists in the 21s' Century, Note: "Colombia Weeps
But Doesn 't Surrender": The Battle for Peace in Colombia's Civil War and the
Problematic Solutions of President Alvaro Uribe, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV.
719, 727-35 (arguing that Uribe's plan to disarm the AUC by allowing them to avoid jail
time by simply admitting their crimes, turning over their arms, and making symbolic acts
of retribution to victims violates human rights standards).
71 See Human Rights Watch Country Summary: Colombia, January 2007,
http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01 / 11 /colomb 14884.htm.
72 See Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Colombia, supra note 70, at 10.
See also Human Rights Watch Country Summary: Colombia, January 2007,
http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/ 1 /colomb14884.htm.
73 See Human Rights Watch Country Summary: Colombia, January 2007,
http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/ 1 /colomb I4884.htm
74 See Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Colombia, supra note 70 at 10.
75 Id. at 9.
76 See U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2006:
Colombia (released May 6, 2007), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78885.htm.
77 See Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Colombia, supra note 70, at 9.
"Some cases were recorded in which the [military] commanders themselves allegedly
agreed to dress up the victims in guerrilla clothing in order to cover up the facts and
simulate death in action." Id. at 10.
78 See U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2006:
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credible reports that some members of the security forces
cooperated with illegal paramilitaries in violation of orders from
the president and the military high command.... Such collaboration
often facilitated unlawful killings and sometimes may have
involved direct participation in paramilitary atrocities."7 9 Thus, it
cannot be ignored that while the Colombian government is
officially attempting to dismantle paramilitaries, it is also
complicit in the actions of the paramilitaries, either through direct
involvement or through willful blindness and by failing to
prosecute those guilty of atrocities.
D. External Influences: The Role of the United States in the
Colombian Conflict
When analyzing the different actors in the Colombian struggle,
the impact and influence that United States policy towards
Colombia has had in shaping the conflict is worthy of exploration,
especially as we evaluate U.S. responsibility owed to the victims
of the struggle. The first major chapter in U.S.- Colombian affairs
was written when the Canal Zone was established in the Isthmus
of Panama, which until 1903 was Colombian territory."0 The U.S.
originally established a treaty to establish the Canal Zone with the
Colombian government, but after the Colombian Senate balked at
the amount of payment and concerns over subjugation of
Colombian sovereignty to U.S. interests, they rejected the treaty.81
Furious, President Theodore Roosevelt worked to encourage
secessionist forces in Panama, and intervened to prevent the
Colombian military from putting down the insurrection. After
quickly recognizing the legitimacy of the new Panamanian
government, the U.S. entered into a new canal treaty with them to
establish the Canal Zone.82 After years of bitter dispute over the
region, the U.S. agreed to pay Colombia $25 million for their role
in the loss of Panama.83 This was the first in major expenditures
that the United States would make to ensure their own self-
Colombia (released May 6, 2007), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78885.htm.
79 Id. at § la.
80 See SAFFORD AND PALACIOS, supra note 31, at 217-21.
81 See Dugas, supra note 30, at 505.
82 Id.
83 DUDLEY, supra note 42, at 9.
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interests were protected in Colombia, at times to the detriment of
the people of Colombia.
The Cold War was the next impetus for United States
intervention that would go far to shape the current conflict. As
mentioned previously, after la Violencia ended, the Communist
Party of Colombia loosely held five municipalities in the Tolima
province.84 President Kennedy's "Alliance for Progress," an
economic development plan for Latin America, consisted of a
"carrot and stick" approach to deterring the growth of
communism. 85 Kennedy's plan provided economic incentives for
those that turned away from communism, and then applied a large
stick to combat further growth of communism militarily.86 With
the help of the U.S. military, the Colombian government defeated
these 'independent republics' but the unintended consequence was
a resurgence of the "Southern Tolima Bloc" into the stronger
entity that exists today: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia, or the FARC.87
The end of the Cold War and the subsequent loss of military
and economic support for the guerrilla groups forced them to look
to other funding sources, most notably, the trafficking of illegal
narcotics.8 8 As the United States was the primary market for this
product, -the U.S. again asserted its influence on Colombian
internal affairs in its ongoing "War on Drugs." 89 Continuing with
its 'carrot and stick' approach, U.S. aid to Colombia to fight the
war on drugs has consisted largely of military training of
Colombian and paramilitary forces, weapons, and large scale
fumigation of coca and marijuana crops.90 In the 1980s, in the
face of an intense government crackdown on drug trafficking, the
84 Dugas, supra note 30, at 506.
85 DAVID BUSHNELL, THE MAKING OF MODERN COLOMBIA: A NATION IN SPITE OF
ITSELF 231 (1993).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 10.
88 Nagle Survey, supra note 63, at 14-15.
89 Id. at 15-16 "[T]he declaration of the war on drugs by the U.S. government...
[led to] a bloodbath between the Colombian government and the notorious drug cartels
who struggled to prevent extradition to the United States and spawned a new form of
terrorism: narco-terrorism." Id. at 15.
90 DUDLEY, supra note 42, at 170, 201.
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Medellin cartel declared war on the Colombian Government.91
"The cartel began a campaign of terror that shook Colombian
society with its blatant violations of international humanitarian law
and whose principal weapons were intimidation, dynamite attacks,
car bombs, kidnappings, and assassinations, primarily of
civilians." 92 The George H. W. Bush administration responded to
President Barco's plight by announcing a five year, $2.2 billion
Andean Initiative, aid that was primarily "military in nature. 93
Under the Gaviria Administration, Pablo Escobar, the infamous
leader of the Medellin cartel, turned himself in under a highly
beneficial deal in which he was able to continue directing his
trafficking activities from jail.94 When a transfer to a more secure
prison was ordered, Escobar escaped, leading to another upswing
in drug-related violence until his death in 1993. 9' The Cali Cartel
quickly stepped into the void left by the demise of the Medellin
Cartel.96 The Samper Administration, mired in a drug scandal
where he was accused of taking millions of dollars of campaign
contributions from the Cali cartel (for which he was later
exonerated), nevertheless resulted in U.S. action to try and force
the Colombian President's resignation.97  Colombia was
decertified in the Clinton Administration's review of international
cooperation with the "War on Drugs," which led to a cancellation
of U.S. aid to Colombia, and Samper's visa was cancelled by the
U.S. State Department in 1996.98 The effect of the Colombian
government's preoccupation with fighting the drug cartels was to
leave the guerrilla groups and right-wing paramilitary groups
unchecked, allowing them to grow in strength during this period.99
The election of conservative Andr6s Pastrana led to another
period of increased U.S. involvement in the internal affairs of
Colombia. In an effort to negotiate peace with the FARC,
91 Dugas, supra note 30, at 512.
92 Id. at 512.
93 Id. at 512-13.
94 Id. at 515.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Dugas, supra note 30, at 515-16.
98 Id. at 515.
99 Id. at 516.
[Vol. XXXIII
THE COLOMBIAN CRISIS IN CONTEXT
Pastrana established a demilitarized zone, a move criticized by the
U.S. government, as they saw the FARC as nothing more than
narco-traffickers and the demilitarized zone as a dangerous haven
for the unchecked growth of illicit crops in the zone. °0 Pastrana
acted to appease the United States by submitting to "Plan
Colombia," a "multifaceted program designed to eradicate illicit
crops, support a negotiated settlement with the guerrilla
movements, revive the moribund Colombian economy, and
provide aid for judicial institutions, human rights, and alternative
development."'01 In reality, most U.S. resources went towards
militarizing the counter-narcotics forces of the Colombian security
forces, pushing the fight into FARC controlled areas."0 2
The current Colombian President, Alvaro Uribe, "has stated on
numerous occasions that he shares the viewpoints of both the Bush
and Clinton Administrations that drugs are at the center of the
terrorism problem in Colombia." '' °3 Under George W. Bush's
administration, efforts have focused on crop eradication, an effort
which has been successful at reducing nearly 163,000 acres of
coca crops to fewer than 12,000 acres in three years.0 4 However
this measure of "success" has been matched by an escalation of
violence during this same period.'0 5 Although the U.S. State
Department conditioned the granting of $700 million in aid to
Colombia in 2004 on compliance with human rights protection, it
has "twice granted certification for Colombia to receive a total of
more than $61 million in aid without holding Colombia
accountable for the defense of human rights.' 0 6
Critics of the U.S. War on Drugs argue that if the primary goal
of the administration is to halt the production of coca, the money
currently being used to militarize the eradication efforts would be
100 Esquirol, supra note 51, at 54.
101 Dugas, supra note 30, at 517.
102 Id.
103 Nagle Survey, supra note 63, at 16.
104 Posnanski, supra note 70, at 737.
105 Id. at 737-38.
106 Id. at 738. Congressional conditions on U.S. aid to Colombia require Uribe's
administration to break ties between its military and the AUC, suspend officers
suspected of human rights abuses, investigate and arrest paramilitary leaders and restore
order. Id.
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better spent by simply paying cultivators to halt production.0 7
There are perhaps other forces at work preventing this simple
solution, namely the business interests of the private corporations
who produce the necessary chemicals for coca refinement, as "[a]
successful war on drugs would simply put them out of
business."' 8  Other critics call for U.S. involvement in the
Colombian peace process, but argue that the only successful
approach would be to focus less on the aspects of the drug trade
that contribute to violence in the country, and instead on
redistributing economic wealth across society, and political
enfranchisement of excluded parties. 1°9 "It must be remembered
that drug-trafficking is not the root cause of political violence -
even if it does help to finance it.""..0
E. Caught in the Crossfire: Effect on Civilian Population
As these forces battle for control and influence, it is the
civilian population that suffers. Civilians live in constant fear for
their lives and the lives of their loved ones as they struggle to
remain invisible to the various violent actors in a battle where all
sides demand allegiance."' "Although the number of killings and
kidnappings in some parts of the country fell, serious human rights
abuses committed by all parties to the conflict remained at critical
levels.""'  The paramilitary groups, who have been under a
ceasefire since 2002, still had more than 3,000 killings and
107 Nagle Survey, supra note 63, at 16 (citing Disrupting the Market:
Implementation, and Results in Narcotics Source Countries: Hearing on International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Before the H. Comm. On Government Reform,
107th Cong. (2003) (statement of Paul E. Simmons, Acting Asst. Sec. of State, Int'l
Narcotics and Law Enforcement)). See also Esquirol, supra note 51, at 24 (arguing that
U.S. focus on a militarized solution to the war on drugs simply begets more violence in
the guerrilla war, and that putting the drug war ahead of the peace process is a
questionable strategy).
108 Nagle Survey, supra note 63, at 16.
109 Esquirol, supra note 51, at 82.
110 Id. at 83.
111 See Alexandra De La Asuncion, Comment: Colombia: The Ignored
Humanitarian Crisis, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 439, 451 (2000).
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disappearances attributed to them between 2002 and 2006.113
Paramilitary groups have been implicated in "'social cleansing'
killings of prostitutes, drug users, vagrants and gang members" in
areas under their control, and are also known to target indigenous
and Afro-Colombian members of the population.114 Their methods
are notorious and particularly gruesome." 5 Human rights activists,
journalists, and indigenous community leaders are also known
targets to the paramilitary organizations.' 1 6 Mass graves continue
to be uncovered, two of them on former AUC ranches in the Sucre
Department containing 72 bodies.' 17  Numerous kidnappings of
persons suspected of collaboration with guerilla groups were
conducted by the AUC in 2005. One effective tactic in terrorizing
the local populations has been to control or prevent the delivery of
food and supplies into towns and regions considered to be
sympathetic to guerrilla groups, resulting in forced
displacement." 8 Child recruitment in both paramilitary groups
and guerrilla forces is another serious human rights concern. "At
least one of every four irregular combatants in Colombia is under
eighteen years of age. Of these, several thousand are under the
age of fifteen, the minimum recruitment age permitted under the
Geneva Conventions."'"19
Guerrilla forces are suspected of committing close to 400
terrorist attacks during the first eight months of 2005.12 That pace
has only increased in 2006, with guerrillas suspected of
113 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, COUNTRY REPORT ON COLOMBIA 88 (2007),
http://thereport.amnesty.org/document/15. See also U.S. Dep't of State Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Colombia, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1.g. (Mar. 8, 2006),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61721 .htm [hereinafter Colombia 2006].
114 Id.
115 Id. An autopsy report of twelve Afro-Colombian youth showed their bodies had
been burnt with acid and they received gunshots to the head. See id.
116 Id. at Intro.
117 Id. at § 1.g.
118 Id. at §§ 1.g;2.d.
119 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COUNTRY SUMMARY: COLOMBIA 3 (2006),
http://hrw.org/wr2k6/pdf/colombia.pdf (noting that 80% of forced child recruits fight for
the FARC or ELN, the remaining 20% for paramilitary groups).
120 Colombia 2006, supra note 113, at § l.g.
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committing 646 terrorist acts during 2006.121 While the FARC and
ELN tend to target politicians, local leaders, priests and members
of security forces,12 they are also guilty of indiscriminate killings
of civilians. A 2003 bombing of a club in Bogota by the FARC
killed 36 people. 2 3 The FARC is suspected of a grenade attack on
a daycare center that killed one child in an attack "directed against
the families of recently demobilized paramilitaries.' 24  Both
groups are suspected of numerous kidnappings, many of them
either politically motivated to gain the release of guerrilla leaders,
or to collect ransom as a source of revenue.'25 The Colombian
government suspects that there are anywhere from 70 thousand to
100 thousand landmines deployed throughout the nation, with the
guerrillas responsible for about seventy-five percent. Victims are
often civilians. 126  Guerrillas have also been responsible for
forcibly displacing persons to clear key drug and weapon routes. 127
The FARC has blockaded towns, effectively cutting off food and
supplies to villages suspected of holding paramilitary or
government collaborators.1 28
"The internal armed conflict was the major cause of internal
displacement [in Colombia].', 129 The CIA World Factbook places
the number of internally displaced persons at somewhere between
1.8 million and 3.8 million, 13 putting the Colombian internal
displacement crisis second only to Sudan in severity.'3 ' Over
300,000 have fled to neighboring states, creating a humanitarian
121 U.S. Dep't of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Colombia,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES § 1.g (Mar. 6, 2007),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78885.htm [hereinafter Colombia 2007].
122 Id. The FARC is suspected of killing nearly 400 members of public security
forces in 2006. See id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Nagle, supra note 22, at 446-52.
126 Colombia 2006, supra note 113, at § 1.g.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at § 2.d.
130 CIA, Colombia, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (Jan. 24, 2008), available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/co.html#People.
131 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 119, at 4. See also supra note 2.
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crisis along the borders, especially along the southern border with
Ecuador.1 2 Many of the displaced have moved from their rural
homes to urban centers. 133
They suffer from extortion and their children are pushed
into prostitution or into gangs. Even worse, they.
sometimes fall prey again to persecution from the same
irregular armed groups they fled from in the first place.
The result is that many people are forced to displace again,
sometimes within the same city.' 
34
From this historical backdrop and illustration of the current
human rights crisis in Colombia, we turn to an overview of the
relief that is available to victims of terror and persecution in the
United States, specifically in the area of U.S. Refugee and Asylum
law.
III. Overview of U.S. Relief Available to Victims and
Colombian Cases in Context
A. Overview of US Asylum Law
The overarching premise to granting relief to victims of torture
and persecution in the United States is the doctrine of
nonrefoulement. 135 The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees is the foundation of this doctrine, and "provides two
guarantees: 1) no refugee may be returned to a land where her life
or freedom would be threatened, and 2) those refugees who have
been lawfully admitted to the receiving state are guaranteed equal
treatment in exercising enumerated civil and political rights." '136
132 WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 130. See also Kelli Rose McGhee, U.N. Report:
The Rising Number of Internally-Displaced Persons in Colombia and the United
Nations' Response, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 843 (2003) (noting that Ecuador is the
only country bordering Colombia that offers refugee status to Colombian nationals).
133 Marie-H6lne Vemey, Colombian Conflict Drives Displaced to a Life of Fear on
a Garbage Dump, UNHCR, Oct. 25, 2006, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/453f33e04.html.
134 Id.
135 Nonrefoulement is defined as a "refugee's right not to be expelled from one state
to another, especially to one where his or her life or liberty would be threatened."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1038 (8th ed. 2004).
136 DAVID A. MARTIN, T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, HIROSIl MOTOMURA &
MARYELLEN FULLERTON, FORCED MIGRATION: LAW AND POLICY 69 (2007).
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U.S. Asylum Law is derived from the 1951 Convention, the
substantive provisions of which were included in the 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.'37 After becoming a
party to the Protocol in 1968, the United States became bound by
the doctrines concerning protection of refugees, which, aside from
providing the definition of 'refugee' that would later be
incorporated into U.S. domestic law, also provided for "the
absolute prohibition under Article 33 against return of a person
whose life or freedom would be threatened in the country s/he
fled."' 138 Apart from returning an applicant to a third country, the
minimum benefit under U.S. immigration laws that accomplishes
the objectives of Article 33 is withholding of removal.
"'Withholding of removal' is usually a companion form of relief
to asylum... an application for asylum generally also is considered
an application for withholding of removal.', 139 A third provision
that provides protection is found under the Convention Against
Torture. In 1984, the United Nations adopted the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), to which the U.S. became a full
party in 1994.' Article 3 of the CAT provides the basis for relief
by imposing a nonrefoulement obligation on all state parties,
stating that "No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or
extradite a person to another State where there are substantial
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture.'' While Article 33 of the 1951 Convention
and Article 3 of the CAT impose a mandatory obligation on
member states not to return certain victims of persecution and
torture, the Convention does not require a country to grant asylum
status. This form of relief is discretionary, and the benefits are
137 Id. (citing 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees).
138 See IRA J. KuRZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 341 (10th ed. 2006). This
protection is also known as nonrefoulement. See BLACK, supra note 136, at 1038. See
also MARTIN, ET AL, supra note 136, at 73 (pointing out that Art. 33 only requires
protection from return, and does not require states to provide work authorization or other
benefits).
139 DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1999).
140 Id. at 466.
141 MARTIN ET AL., supra note 136, at 449.
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more substantial. 142
Although the United States became party to the Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1967, it did not enact
legislation to implement the Protocol until 1980.141 "The Refugee
Act of 1980 adopted from the [1951 Refugee] Convention the
definition of 'refugee,' which lies at the core of both asylum and
refugee status, and the Convention's fundamental obligation of
protection against return.' ' 144 U.S. Statute under the act defines a
refugee as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of
such person's nationality.., who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to
avail himself or herself of the protection of that
country because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion...
141
How this definition has been interpreted in subsequent
regulation, agency determinations and court decisions has led
some to question whether the United States can still claim to be a
member to the treaty.'46 This paper will now discuss ways that
terms like "persecution," "on account of," "political opinion," and
"membership in a particular social group" have been construed in
U.S. courts, giving some credence to the belief that the U.S. has
violated the Convention.
142 See Anwen Hughes, Asylum and Withholding of Removal-A Brief Overview of
the Substantive Law, in BASIC IMMIGRATION LAW 308 (Stephen W. Yale-Loehr ed.
2006). Asylum benefits grant full membership including eligibility for permanent
residence, travel, right to petition for family members to join, and refugee benefits. See
id.
143 MARTIN ET AL., supra note 136, at 72-73.
144 ANKER, SUpra note 139, at 3-4.
145 INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. §1 101(a)(42)(A) (1994 & 1997 Supp.).
146 See, e.g., Lori Adams, U.N. Report: Refugee Rights in the U.S. Scaled Back by
Recent Anti-Terrorism Legislation: Are We Violating the United Nations Refugee
Convention, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 807, 809-13 (2003) (discussing how post-9/11
security reforms have threatened U.S. compliance with the Refugee Convention); Robert
K. McAndrews, Asylum Law Reform, 8 NEW ENG. INT'L & CoMP. L. ANN. 103, 124
(2002) (stating that "[t]he evidence strongly supports the conclusion that the new
provisions have been a setback for asylum protection and for the humane treatment of
asylum seekers.").
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1. Persecution
"There is no universally agreed upon definition of
persecution." '147 Article 33 of the 1951 Convention states that no
contracting member will return someone to his home country
where "his life or freedom would be threatened., 14 8 This threat
does not have to be physical in nature. 149 "Tyranny over the mind
and spirit of a person has been demonstrated as more fearsome
than the ancient methods of torture."'"5  Judge Posner defined
persecution as "punishment for political, religious or other reasons
that our country does not recognize as legitimate.''. A preceding
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision defined persecution
as meaning "the infliction of suffering or harm in order to punish
an individual for possessing a particular belief or characteristic the
persecutor seeks to overcome."' 52 These vague definitions may
leave one with the impression that the court is imposing a "we
know it when we see it" standard, but case law has developed a set
of certain acts or forms of abuse that amount to persecution. 53
"Mere harassment or discrimination.., does not rise to the level of
persecution."' 154 Nor do generalized and widespread conditions of
hardship or violence. 1'5
The first step to establishing an asylum claim is to demonstrate
past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. 15 6
147 KAREN MUSALO, JENNIFER MOORE & RICHARD A. BOSWELL, REFUGEE LAW AND
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 233 (Carolina Academic Press 1997).
148 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150.
149 See Kovac v. I.N.S., 407 F.2d 102, 105-07 (9th Cir. 1969) (noting § 243(h) of
the Immigration and National Act was amended, deleting the adjective "physical" from
the original. Court held that under the amended statute, a "probability of deliberate
imposition of substantial economic disadvantage upon an alien for reasons of race,
religion, or political opinion is sufficient.., to withhold deportation").
150 Id. at 107.
151 Osaghae v. I.N.S., 942 F.2d 1160, 1163 (7th Cir. 1991).
152 Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 234 (B.I.A. 1985).
153 See REGINA GERMAIN, AILA's ASYLUM PRIMER: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO U.S.
ASYLUM LAW AND PROCEDURE 28-30 (4th ed. 2005) (listing cases where acts have
amounted to persecution).
154 Id. at 30 (citing specific examples in note 108).
155 Id. at 30.
156 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2001); I.N.A. § 208(b); GERMAIN, supra note 154,
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To claim past persecution as a basis for asylum, an applicant must
prove an incident that "(1) rises to the level of persecution; (2) is
on account of one of the statutorily-protected grounds; and (3) is
committed by the government or forces the government is either
unable or unwilling to control."' 57  If the applicant has thus
established past persecution, a well-founded fear of future
persecution is presumed unless there have been substantial
changes in the home country.1
58
In the absence of past persecution, an applicant must "establish
a 'well-founded fear of persecution,' [showing] that a reasonable
person in the same circumstances would fear persecution if
removed to his or her home country."' 59 In the landmark case INS
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, the Supreme Court noted that there was no
minimum percentage probability that had to be proved, but that
fear could be well-founded "even if there is only a slight, though
discernible, chance of persecution."'6 ° Courts have held that fear
must be genuine but also reasonable,' 6 ' as irrational apprehension
is insufficient to establish a well-founded fear of persecution.'62
In Matter of Mogharrabi, the BIA established four elements
that must be shown to establish a well-founded fear of
persecution.'63  First, the applicant must possess a belief or
characteristic sought to be overcome by means of punishment of
some type. Second, the persecutor must be aware or could
become aware that this person possesses this belief or
characteristic. Finally, the persecutor must have both the
capability and the inclination to punish the applicant.'64 It is
crucial to note that if a person has the ability to avoid persecution
by moving to another part of his or her country, it is considered
at 21.
157 Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2004).
158 See 8 C.F.R at § 208.13(b)(1)(i).
159 Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I & N Dec. 439, 445 (B.I.A. 1987); GERMAIN supra
note 153, at 25.
160 I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987).
161 Knezevic, supra note 158, at 1213; Bhatt v. Reno, 172 F.3d 978, 981 (7th Cir.
1999).
162 Gonahasa v. I.N.S., 181 F.3d 538, 541 (4th Cir. 1999).
163 Mogharrabi, 19 1 & N at 446.
164 GERMAIN, supra note 153 at 26. See also Mogharrabi, 19 1 & N at 446.
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reasonable to expect the applicant to do so under all
circumstances. 165
2. Colombians, Generalized Violence, and the
Persecution Standard
There are three areas where Colombian applicants tend to fail
the first requirement of asylum: establishing persecution. All three
are related to the general issue of how the asylum laws deal with
the problem of generalized violence. The first area is the
requirement for particularized violence, the second is the internal
relocation requirement, and the third is in establishing that their
victimization rises to the level of persecution.
"The Board and most courts have rejected claims based
exclusively on general civil strife or widespread, random
violence. 1 66 Rather, asylum applicants must establish that they
face a particularized threat specific to the applicant.1 67 Although a
strict reading of the "singled out for persecution" approach has
been rejected, one must still prove the persecution suffered was
particular to him or to those similarly situated.1 68 Proving one is
similarly situated relates back to establishing membership in a
group likely to be targeted, which for reasons we will see later can
be problematic in itself Further related to the issue of widespread
violence is the internal relocation requirement.
Before one can be granted asylum in the United States,
applicants must convince the Immigration Judge that there was no
safe alternative for relocation within the home country. 169 Judges
have been quick to assume that because there are zones where the
FARC, ELN, and AUC do not have complete control, there exist
alternatives for safe relocation within Colombia. However,
successfully hiding one's new whereabouts is extremely difficult
in Colombia. "Domestic servants, taxi drivers, and security guards
165 8 C.F.R. at § 208.13(b)(2)(ii).
166 ANKER, supra note 139, at 68.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 68-69. The "similarly situated persons" requirement was codified at 8
C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(iii).
169 The internal relocation requirement was codified in regulations adopted in 2001
at 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)-(3).
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spy on their employers" to inform the various armed groups on the
new location of their targets. 7° Corruption amongst those that
work with the government is rampant, and internal controls on
movement of the population through specific zones of conflict
provide a documentary trail for corrupt officials to sell to
guerrillas and paramilitaries."7' And even though a group may not
be particularly active in a specific region, both guerrilla and
paramilitary organizations have well-developed intelligence
networks that effectively span all areas of the country.'72
However, even if an individual has established that he has been
particularly targeted, and has convinced a court that internal
relocation is not reasonable, he must still establish that the harms
perpetrated against him rise to the level of persecution.
The record is littered with cases where Colombian applicants
were denied asylum because the actions perpetrated on them were
not seen as rising to the level of persecution under the exacting
standards of U.S. asylum laws.173 Sepulveda and Silva are two
cases in this area that provide some insight. Joana Claudia
Sepulveda was a member of a university group that organized
political debates, marches, and demonstrations. 74 After the "la
Maria" kidnapping, perpetrated by members of the ELN,
Sepulveda and other members of her group assisted with the
coordination of negotiations between the kidnappers and the
170 Nagle, supra note 22, at 460.
171 Id. at 462 (noting that citizens traveling through zones of conflict must officially
register with the government).
172 Id. at 463 (describing a professor from Bogotd who fled the FARC by moving to
a northern university, but whose students aligned with the FARC informed on him within
weeks of his arrival).
173 See generally Hurtado v. U.S. Att'y Gen., No. 06-12802, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS
28239 (11 th Cir. Nov. 15, 2006) (finding that threatening phone calls and robbery are not
sufficiently severe to constitute persecution); Munoz v. U.S. Att'y Gen., No. 06-10701,
2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 23675 (lth Cir. Sept. 15, 2006) (holding that threats only
constituted harassment, not persecution); Aguilera v. U.S. Att'y Gen., No. 06-10747,
2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 20891 (1 1th Cir. Aug. 15, 2006) (finding single death threat by
violent group did not rise to level of persecution); De Jesus Restrepo v. U.S. Att'y Gen.,
No. 05-14797, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 15150 (1 1th Cir. June 20, 2006) (finding that
threatening phone calls and guerrilla group's takeover of power plant forcing applicant to
quit his job did not rise to level of persecution as applicant suffered no physical harm).
174 Sepulveda v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1229 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
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hostages' families.175 After beginning her involvement, Sepulveda
received "three threatening telephone calls at her home. The
callers, identifying themselves as ELN members, called Sepulveda
by name, used profanity, directed her to stop her peace activities,
and made death threats." '176 One day, shortly after she finished her
shift, a bomb placed in the mailbox at her restaurant exploded.
77
Her brother was threatened on account of her activities as well. 78
Although the court found Sepulveda's testimony to be credible,
they still held that the threats and bombing did not rise to the level
of persecution to support her claim for asylum. 7 9 The court noted
that while there is no precise definition of persecution, courts have
held that "'persecution' is an 'extreme concept,' requiring 'more
than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation,'
and that '[m]ere harassment does not amount to persecution. ' 180
Since the actions of the ELN did not rise to the level of
persecution, the court decided that "[a]lthough Sepulveda may
subjectively fear returning to Colombia at this time, her fear [was]
not objectively reasonable based on the record evidence."'' The
bombing may have satisfied the court as rising to the level of
persecution, but it failed on nexus grounds.'82
The second case is Silva v. U.S. Att'y Gen.183  Luz Marina
Silva sought political asylum due to persecution by the FARC.
While working on a political campaign, Silva received a written
death threat signed by the FARC.' 84 She characterized the note as
175 Id. To facilitate communication with the kidnappers during negotiations, the





179 Id. at 1231.
180 Sepulveda, 401 F.3d. at 1231 (citing Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1355
(11 th Cir. 2000)).
181 Id. at 1232 (citing Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1289 (11 th Cir. 2001)).
182 Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1231. "Although the evidence may permit a conclusion
the restaurant bombing was directed at Sepulveda on account of her political activity, it
does not compel such a conclusion." Id. (citing I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478,
481, n.1 (1992)).
183 Silva v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229 (1 1th Cir. 2006).
184 Id. at 1234.
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a "condolence note" that read, "Luz Marina Silva rest in peace for
doing what she shouldn't be doing in the wrong place."'8 5 After
that, the FARC started calling her daily at her house and
restaurant, and then on October 9, 1999, three weeks after
receiving the note, two men on motorcycles shot at her car while
she was driving and hit the rear window. Silva was uninjured in
the shooting incident.18 6 She received a call that night warning her
not to report the shooting to the authorities."7 Silva left for the
U.S. in November of 1999, but returned within a few months to
visit a dying relative."8 Although Silva hoped that enough time
had elapsed that she could go back safely, she started receiving
anonymous phone calls "daily."'8 9
In the last call she received prior to leaving for the United
States for the second time, the caller states that she had been
missed on October 9, but warned her not to provoke them again
stating, "we are not going to miss a second time, we're going to
kill you."' 9 ° In the opinion, the court stressed that none of the
''new anonymous telephone calls referenced her political activity,
and there is no evidence that Silva engaged in any political activity
in 2000. Apart from the anonymous phone calls, Silva did not
have any problems in Colombia after she returned."''
Citing their decision in Sepulveda, the court concluded that
"the 'condolence note' Silva received was on account of her
political activity, but this one incident is not sufficient to entitle
Silva to asylum." 19 2 The court assumed for the sake of argument
that the shooting would rise to the level of persecution, but





189 Silva, 448 F.3d at 1234.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 1235.
192 Id. at 1237. The court similarly discounted the anonymous telephone calls on
nexus grounds, stating "[allthough the timing of the telephone calls supports an
inference that the calls were related to Silva's political activity, the evideice also
supports an inference that the calls were unrelated to that activity," as none of the calls
explicitly referenced her political activity. Id.
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she did not know who shot at her car or why."' 93 The court then
used the language found in Elias-Zacarias, stating that "although
the timing of the shooting would allow an inference that it was
related to the 'condolence note,' the record does not compel that
conclusion."' 94 And in language which has been followed in more
than twenty-five cases in the Eleventh Circuit following the
decision in Silva, "only in a rare case does the record compel the
conclusion that an applicant for asylum suffered past persecution
or has a well-founded fear of future persecution."'' 95
The court then discussed the generalized violence in Colombia
as a more probable reason for the shooting incident. "[T]he
shooting incident ... did not distinguish her from the majority of
Colombians who are also subject to the general conditions of
violence and criminal activity in Colombia."'196  Further
illuminating is the court's finding that "Colombia is a place where
the awful is ordinary, but we must state the obvious: if four out of
every ten murders are on account of a protected ground, six out of
ten are not."' 97  While the court did not find Silva lacked
credibility, the court did note that her testimony was "full of
holes." 198
Of note in this case was a vigorous dissent by Judge Cames.
"Only in the majority's imagination do would-be killers wear
name tags or drive around on motorcycles with vanity plates
displaying the name of their terrorist organization."' 99 The dissent
193 Id. at 1238.
194 Id. See also Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483.
195 Silva, 448 F.3d at 1239 (emphasis added).
196 Id. at 1238.
197 Id. at 1242. This statement seems to ignore the holding in Cardoza-Fonseca
requiring no minimum percentage of probability of persecution. I.N.S. v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987).
198 Id. at 1239. It is important to note that Silva appeared pro se before the
Immigration Judge. This is a common occurrence in immigration proceedings. It is
impossible to know whether the outcome would have been different with the benefit of
counsel at the time of her initial hearing. See generally Andrew I. Schoenholtz &
Jonathan Jacobs, The State of Asylum Representation: Ideas for Change, 16 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 739 (2002) (noting that "represented asylum cases are four to six times
more likely to succeed than pro se ones"). See also Beth J. Werlin, Note, Renewing the
Call: Immigrants' Right to Appointed Counsel in Deportation Proceedings, 20 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 393 (2000).
199 Silva, 448 F.3d at 1246.
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also took issue with the majority's reliance on a "widespread terror
exception to asylum laws" noting if the existence of indiscriminate
violence is allowed to destroy an otherwise approvable asylum
claim on recognized grounds "no one from Colombia would ever
be eligible for asylum. 20 °
3. Reforming what Constitutes 'Persecution'
The abuses of the FARC, ELN and AUC often start with
threats or intimidation. The evidence shows, however, that these
groups often make good on their threats, especially in the face of
noncompliance with their demands.2 1 It would seem that the
statutory definition of persecution, which does not allow "mere
harassment or intimidation" to rise to the level of persecution
would require one to actually experience physical harm before
asylum would be granted.20 2 "It is much easier for the adjudicator
to decide that a certain act does not amount to persecution than for
the claimant to convince a court that it does, unless the act is
manifestly atrocious and barbaric by nature. 20 3
Requiring an asylum seeker to actually experience physical
violence before extending refuge is not a morally conscionable
requirement. As such, the first step towards fixing asylum law for
persons who have suffered harm, especially at the hands of non-
state actors, would be for courts to recognize that there may be
few warnings before serious harm or death occurs. A reasonable
person whose collective experience in their community has
demonstrated that guerrilla and paramilitary groups make good on
their threats, and then flees his or her country due to that very real
threat, should be able to establish a well-founded fear of
200 Id. at 1248. The dissent goes on to fault the highly deferential standard
orfreview heavily relied upon by the majority, stating that "[t]he majority opinion refers
to the often-mentioned, but never sighted, 'rare case' in which the facts are so
compelling that we will reverse an immigration judge's finding ... No published opinion
of this Court has ever found that rare case, and today's decision indicates that such a
case, like the fabled unicorn, exists only in our imagination." Id. at 1248-49. See also
discussion of judicial review infra pp. 498-99.
201 See discussion supra pp. 472-75.
202 Kidane, supra note 10, at 140.
203 Id. It is indeed a strange paradox in asylum practice to feel a sense of elation
that your client endured actual physical harm, not because one is happy that the client
suffered, but because it means one can more easily prove persecution.
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persecution in U.S. Courts. This threshold change would not
'open the floodgates' to asylum claims, because the applicants
must still run the rest of the asylum gauntlet by establishing the
persecution they have suffered was on account of a recognized
ground.
B. Grounds of Persecution
Persecution will not trigger protection in an asylum case unless
it can be established that it was "on account of one of five
enumerated grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion."2 °4  This is often
referred to as the nexus requirement.2"5 The phrase 'on account of'
requires that there is a relationship between the harm inflicted and
one of the five enumerated grounds; unfortunately, the courts have
interpreted that relationship in substantially different ways.0 6 In
the 1980s, the BIA set about interpreting the nexus requirement,
deciding that 'on account of required proof that the persecutor
was motivated to punish the victim because of a characteristic
covered by one of the five grounds.20 7 The Ninth Circuit adopted a
more liberal approach, focusing on the effect of persecution on the
victim rather than proof of the persecutor's motivation.20 8 The
Supreme Court attempted to resolve the inconsistency between the
BIA and the Ninth Circuit by addressing the nexus issue in INS v.
Elias-Zacarias.20 9 The court rejected the Ninth Circuit position
that "political entities should be presumed to have political
motives in relation to harm or threatened harm of victims"
requiring instead a "causal, motivational link between victim and
persecutor., 210  The Court also addressed the evidentiary issues
raised due to the difficulty of providing proof of a persecutor's
motives. The Court responded to this concern by stating that they
204 MARTIN ET AL., supra note 136, at 190 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2000),
66 Stat. 163 (1952)).
205 See ANKER, supra note 139, at 268-90; GERMAIN supra note 153, at 32-34;
MARTIN ET AL., supra note 137, at 190.
206 MUSALO ET AL., supra note 147, at 285.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 286.
209 Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 478.
210 ANKER, supra note 139, at 274.
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do not require direct proof of a persecutor's motives, but that one
"must provide some evidence of it, direct or circumstantial."2 1'
1. The Political Opinion Nexus Ground
While all grounds for asylum are deserving of detailed
coverage, the two that figure most prominently to the discussion of
Colombian asylum claims are political opinion and membership in
a particular social group. Two concepts under the political
opinion ground that have grown as a result of armed insurrections,
civil wars, and terrorism are neutrality and imputed political
opinion.212 "At one end of the spectrum, neutrality can be the
result of apathy - of lack of any political. opinion. At the other
end, neutrality can be an articulated political view that expressly
rejects the political aims of warring factions."2 3
a. Neutrality
Matter of Acosta addresses neutrality as a lack of political
opinion.214  Acosta, a member of a taxi cooperative in San
Salvador, El Salvador, refused to participate in work stoppages led
by anti-government guerrillas. 215  Acosta received anonymous
death threats, taxis were seized and burned, and ultimately five
drivers were killed.216 Later, Acosta was beaten in his cab by three
men he thought to be members of the guerilla group.217 Although
the court did not doubt his credibility, it did not find the
persecution was on account of his political opinion because he
offered no facts showing that the guerrillas were aware of his
political opinion nor sought to punish him for it.2 8 The court
noted that "the requirement of 'persecution on account of political
opinion' refers not to the ultimate political end that may be served
by persecution, but to the belief held by an individual that causes
211 Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483.
212 MARTIN ETAL. supra note 136, at 191.
213 Id. at 192.
214 Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 211.
215 Id. at 216.
216 Id. at 216-17.
217 Id. at 217.
218 Id. at 235.
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him to be the object of the persecution." ' 9 But the Ninth Circuit
did not rule out that a refusal to join a particular side "represent[s]
a conscious political choice."22 In Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, the
court found that declining to take a particular side by "refus[ing]
to join [the guerillas'] cause and infiltrate the government on their
behalf' made him just as likely to be considered their political
opponent as "if he had spoken out publicly in opposition to their
,,221cause or tactics.
b. Imputed Political Opinion
Closely related to the concept of neutrality as a per se political
opinion is imputed political opinion. "Persecution on account of
imputed political opinion is persecution on account of what the
persecutor believes the victim's political opinion to be, regardless
of the victim's actual political opinion., 222 Regardless of whether
or not the victim holds a political opinion, if the persecutor
believes that the victim is opposing its own position, a political
opinion is imputed on the victim, for which there is a ground for
asylum.223 The Supreme Court touched on the matter of imputed
political opinion when they established the nexus requirement in
INS v. Elias-Zacarias without endorsing or rejecting it. Referring
to Elias-Zacarias' testimony concerning his reasons for not joining
the guerrilla army, the court said "[n]or is there any indication
(assuming, arguendo, it would suffice) that the guerrillas
erroneously believed that Elias-Zacarias' refusal was politically
based., 224  Although the court's statement implies a certain
skepticism regarding the doctrine of imputed political opinion, the
Ninth Circuit and the BIA have recognized imputed political
219 Id. at 234-35.
220 Bolanos-Hernandez v. I.N.S., 767 F.2d 1277, 1288 (9th Cir. 1984).
221 Id. at 1286.
222 MARTIN ET AL., supra note 136, at 199 (emphasis added).
223 Id. at 199. See also Hernandez-Ortiz v. I.N.S., 777 F.2d 509, 517 (9th Cir. 1985)
(noting when a government or group possesses particular beliefs about a victim's views
or loyalties, "his actual political conduct, be it silence or affirmative advocacy, and his
actual political views, be they neutrality or partisanship, are irrelevant; whatever the
circumstance, the persecution is properly categorized as being 'on account of...
political opinion"').
224 Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 482 (1992).
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opinion as viable. 225  Apart from finding an imputed political
opinion based on the persecutor's belief of the victims' political
views, particular political views can also be imputed as a result of
associations, such as familial association, organizational
association or governmental association. 6
2. Colombian Cases in Context-Political Opinion
Although the context of the violence in Colombia is extremely
political, it is often difficult to prove that the persecution
experienced was 'on account' of a political opinion. Several cases
highlight how the exacting standards of Acosta and Elias-Zacarias
often prove fatal to Colombian asylum claims based on account of
political opinion.
Henry Tamara-Gomez, who had Served in the Colombian Air
Force, was later a civilian employed as a helicopter mechanic as
part of a U.S. program to provide assistance to Colombian law
enforcement in Bogota. 227 In July of 2001, he accompanied the
Colombian National Police on a mission to recover the bodies of
five CNP officers killed by FARC.228 Upon landing, he noticed
they were being filmed by FARC members, only one of whom
was captured.22 9 One month after that incident, Tamara-Gomez
began receiving threatening calls referencing the July 2001
mission.23" They called his cell phone and his home, threatening
his life and those of his family members. He moved his family to
another house, but within weeks the calls resumed.23' "In January
2002, a bicycle bomb exploded in [their] new neighborhood,
killing five. 232 After repeated kidnapping and death threats, and
the CNP unable to offer protection, Tamara-Gomez sent his family
to the United States on visitor visas. Shortly after learning the
FARC had tracked down and murdered the other participants in
225 Canas-Segovia v. I.N.S., 970 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1992); In re S-P-, 21 I. & N.
Dec. 486 (B.I.A. 1996).
226 See generally ANKER, supra note 139, at 331-48.
227 Tamara-Gomez v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 343, 345 (5th Cir. 2006).
228 Id. at 345 (noting that on ride-alongs, he was required to wear a CNP uniform).
229 Id. at 345-46.
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the July 2001 recovery mission, Tamara-Gomez fled to join his
family in the U.S. A few weeks later, the Tamara-Gomez home
was broken into and the words "Sapa Regaldo" (meaning "two-bit
snitch") and the letters "FARC" were spray painted on the walls. 233
The Immigration Judge reduced all of this to generalized
violence in Colombia that did not rise to the level of persecution,
noting that neither Tamara-Gomez nor any member of his family
were "beaten, shot at, kidnapped, or otherwise physically
harmed." '234 In their analysis denying petition for review of the
BIA's affirmation, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that while the
Immigration Judge was correct to consider the lack of actual
physical violence carried out against Tamara-Gomez, "physical
harm is not always a requirement for asylum." '235 However, the
ultimate decision to deny review, in effect upholding the denial of
asylum, was due to a lack of nexus between the persecution and a
statutory ground, in this case, political opinion. 23 6 Tamara-Gomez
asserted he was persecuted on account of imputed political
opinion, arguing "his association with the CNP has caused FARC
to attribute to him the political opinions and beliefs of the
Colombian government, or at least to view him as a political
opponent., 23 ' The Circuit Court agreed that the FARC targeted
Tamara-Gomez not because of his political opinion, but because
they thought he was part of the CNP.238 Thus, even though the
233 Tamara-Gomez, 447 F.3d at 346.
234 Id. at 348. Perhaps this was because they were able to flee, unlike the other
unfortunate members of the rescue mission. Regardless, the Fifth Circuit overruled the
Immigration Judge's finding on that point, noting that his testimony, backed by over 200
pages of documentary evidence regarding the activities of the FARC, "made a
compelling case of persecution." Id.
235 Id. at 349 (citing Aguilera-Cota v. I.N.S., 914 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1990).
Although the court here overturned the Immigration Judge by finding persecution, they
signaled that it is always correct to consider actual physical violence in determining
whether persecution occurred. See supra, pp. 485-86.
236 Tamara-Gomez, 447 F.3d at 349.
237 Id.
238 Id. (noting that dangers faced by military combatants (and policemen) arise
"from the nature of their employment and domestic unrest rather than 'on account of'
immutable characteristics or beliefs within the scope of [8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)]" (citing In
re Fuentes, 19 I & N. Dec. 658, 661 (B.I.A. 1988))). This argument ignores the fact that
his membership in the police was imputed by the FARC because of the requirement of
wearing a CNP uniform, even though he was a civilian employed under a U.S. contract.
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Fifth Circuit expressed sympathy for Tamara-Gomez and his
plight on return to Colombia, it denied his asylum claim
concluding "that the required nexus between the persecution and a
statutory ground for asylum has not been established." '239
Although the violence in Colombia has political underpinnings
at every level, many claims fail because of an unwillingness on the
part of the courts to acknowledge that refusing to cooperate with
one of these groups makes you an enemy of their cause, not just a
target for retribution.24° In Londono v. U.S. Att'y Gen., the victim,
her father, and her brother all worked for a non-profit radio band
(ACBC) whose purpose was to increase communication between
local government and citizens in rural areas.24' After discovering
the FARC had pirated access to the radio band, the brother cut off
their access.242 The FARC contacted them soon after, demanding
renewed access and the codes and serial numbers to the radios of
all their subscribers, with the purpose of using that information to
track down those who had informed the government of their
activities.243 The father refused and soon after the brother's car
was shot at, causing him to crash.244 They both left for the United
Id. at 345.
239 Id. at 349-50. The court also denied his request for withholding of removal, and
relief under the Convention Against Torture. One does not have to establish a nexus to
prove a CAT claim, but the court said that even if he could prove a likelihood of torture
on return to Colombia, he could not claim that the state had acquiesced to torture since
after sending his family away he lived on a military base under protection of the
Colombian military. Id. at 350-51.
240 While some are quick to define the FARC, ELN and AUC as narcotics trafficers,
and some as "narco-terrorists," one cannot deny the political motive of these groups in
the face of FARC press releases targeting elections. See Jeremy McDermott, Colombia
Guerrillas Target Elections, BBC NEWS, (Mar. 10, 2002),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1864267.stm. See also Frank Walsh, Note,
Synchronizing Colombian Narcoterrorism Policy With the War on Terror: The Legality
of Military Deployment by the United States and the Organization of American States, 4
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 453 (2006) (advocating direct military intervention consistent
with the U.S. War on Terror, even though characterizing the FARC, ELN and AUC as
nothing more than "violent criminal organizations").
241 Londono v. U.S. Att'y Gen., No. 05-16249, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 27876, at
1-2 (11 th Cir. 2006).
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States soon after this incident. 45 Soon, Diana received a call from
the FARC, demanding access to their subscriber codes and
information or she would be killed.246 Although she reported the
incidents to the police, she was told they could not protect her, so
she fled to the United States with her sons a few days later.247
Londono based her asylum claim on imputed political opinion by
the FARC, her affiliation with the radio station, and kinship ties to
her brother.248 "Whatever FARC's purpose for using ACBC's
propriety information, it was the information that Londono
possessed, and not her viewpoint on Colombian politics or any
other subject, that caused Londono to suffer FARC's wrath." '249
Cases similar to this abound.25
3. Membership in a Particular Social Group (MPSG)
"Membership in a particular social group" continues to be a
nebulous and shifting ground for asylum, but one of the first cases
to address this issue brings us back to the Matter of Acosta. Apart
from political opinion, Acosta tried to establish that he was a
member of a particular social group, in this case, taxi drivers who
refused to strike.251 The court examined the other grounds listed in
245 Id. at *2-3. The brother, Fernando was granted asylum, but the father Diego died
during the asylum process. Id.
246 Id. at *3. Two months later, two men threatened her with a gun demanding what
her father refused to give. Id. Interrupted by onlookers, the gunmen fled after hitting her
over the head with the gun. Id. That night she received another call telling her she should
thank God for saving her life. Id. at *3-4.
247 Londono, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 27876 at *4.
248 Id. Regarding her claim of imputed political opinion, although the court
recognized the validity of imputed political opinion generally, it stated "[i]mputed or
otherwise, it is the political opinion of the victim, and not the persecutor, that matters for
asylum claims." Id. at 7 (citing Ruiz v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1257-58 (1 1th
Cir. 2006)).
249 Id. at 7-8.
250 See generally Giraldo v. U.S. Att'y Gen., No. 06-12133, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS
28061 (1lth Cir. 2006) (persecution of the father was not on account of protected
ground, but FARC's motivation to obtain financial information about a bank's clients to
which he had access); Berrio-Barrera v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 163 (1st Cir. 2006)
(substantial evidence supported I's finding that kidnapping was based not on protected
ground, but instead to extort money); Rocha v. Gonzales, No. 04-4226-ag NAC, 2006
U.S. App. LEXIS 5062 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that a victim of extortion by guerrillas did
not provide evidence that victimization was on account of protected ground).
251 Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. at 234.
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the Refugee Act, "race, .... religion," "nationality," and "political
opinion" and determined that each of those grounds addressed an
immutable characteristic: "a characteristic that either is beyond the
power of an individual to change or is so fundamental to
individual identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be
changed.252 Applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the court
then interpreted the phrase "persecution on account of membership
in a particular social group" to mean
persecution that is directed toward an individual
who is a member of a group of persons all of whom
share a common, immutable characteristic. The
shared characteristic might be an innate one such as
sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances
it might be a shared past experience such as former
military leadership or land ownership.253
Working as a taxi driver who refused to participate in work
stoppages was not held to be an immutable characteristic, for
while keeping someone from earning any type of livelihood has
been held as rising to the level of persecution, 254  "the
internationally accepted concept of a refugee simply does not
guarantee an individual a right to work in the job of his choice." '255
The problem with this analysis is that even if Acosta were to
change his job, his affiliation with COTAXI had become an
immutable characteristic as a result of being a "shared past
experience" which the same court said might give rise to an
immutable characteristic.256 But this internal inconsistency is
indicative of the courts struggle to define this ground for relief.
A split between several federal courts regarding whether it is
the internal characteristics of the group that qualify it as a
particular social group or rather the external or visible
characteristics of the group that matter continues to mire
jurisprudence in confusion.257 In attempting to clarify this ground,
252 Id. at 233.
253 Id. (emphasis added).
254 ANKER, supra note 139, at 235-43.
255 Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 234.
256 See MUSALO ET AL., supra note 147, at 560 n.3. See generally Acosta, 19 I. & N.
Dec. at 233.
257 See ANKER, supra note 140, at 378. "An over-emphasis on a group's internal
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the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees defined
'particular social group' as: "a group of persons who share a
common characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or
who are perceived as a group by society. The characteristic will
often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise
fundamental to identity, conscience or the exercise of human
rights."258
As IN re C-A-, a case emerging from the strife in Colombia,
has defined the interpretation of a particular social group by
relying on the UNHCR's definition of a particular social group,
this comment will focus on this recent change in interpretation.25 9
4. Colombians Cases in Context - MPSG
We see issues of immutability play out repeatedly in the
particular social group ground. Londono also relied on her
membership in a particular social group to provide the nexus
necessary for her asylum claim.26 ° Although Londono was a
volunteer with the radio station in addition to her full-time job, the
court refused to give weight to this fact when evaluating her
asylum claim under the membership in a particular social group
ground.261 Instead, they decided that since she "allowed ACBC to
wither away" after her father and brother's departure it was "not
so fundamental to Londono's identity or conscience that she could
not continue on in Colombia without it" '262 And although many
circuits have firmly established kinship ties as grounds for finding
characteristics has confused the jurisprudence of the Ninth Circuit . . . [however] [a]n
excessively externalist approach ... can result in groups being circularly defined by their
common victimization." Id. (referencing the Ninth Circuit's holding in Sanchez-Trujillo
v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986)).
258 U.N. Refugee Agency, Guidelines on International Protection: "Membership of
a particular social group" within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention
and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 3 (May 7, 2002), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3d58de2da.pdf (emphasis added) [hereinafter UNHCR
Guidelines].
259 See infra text accompanying notes 261-85.
260 See Londono v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 27876, *8-10 (1 1th Cir.
2006).
261 See id. at *10.
262 Id. at *9 (ignoring the possibility that abandoning the station may have been
motivated by the violence her family suffered at the hands of FARC, not a lack of
passion or conviction).
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a particular social group, the Eleventh Circuit did not feel the need
to do so, assuming that this ground had been adequately
considered by the Immigration Judge at trial.263 Thus, the court
denied her kinship ties with her brother as qualifying her for
membership in a social group, refusing to see the persecution was
a 'but for' cause of her connection to her brother, even though the
FARC specifically mentioned her father and brother in their
threats to her.26
In 2006, the BIA issued a new precedent decision on
membership in a social group, In re C-A- .265 The respondents and
their two children sought asylum on account of imputed political
opinion and membership in a particular social group. Diego
Castillo-Arias owned a bakery in Cali, the home of the infamous
Cali Drug Cartel.266 A former police officer fired for corruption
became the chief of security for the Cartel and would come to the
bakery and brazenly speak in detail of the Cartel's exportation of
narcotics, disclosing the "extent, location and size of the assets of
the Cali cartel" in and outside of Colombia.267 Castillo-Arias, over
the period of four years, relayed this information to his friend,
Vladimir Martinez Meza, who investigated and prosecuted the
traffickers in Cali.268 On May 15, 1995, three men armed with
pistols tried to force Castillo-Arias into their car, and when he
refused, they pushed him to the ground and beat him.2 69 His son
was pistol-whipped in the face, requiring extensive reconstructive
surgery to his mouth and jaw.270 The men fled, warning Castillo-
Arias that things would only get worse for him and his family.271
263 See id. at *12.
264 See id. at *11-13.
265 See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006).
266 See id. at 952. See generally supra, pp. 469-72 (discussing Colombian drug
cartels).
267 Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1191 (1lth Cir. 2006). The
Eleventh Circuit had remanded the question of whether noncriminal informants working
against the Cali drug cartel constitute a 'particular social group' under the I.N.A. After
receiving the lower court's decision that it does not, the circuit court denied Castillo-
Arias' asylum appeal. See id.
268 See id.
269 See id.
270 See id. at 1191-92.
271 See id. at 1191.
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The family moved to another part of Cali, but he could not rent his
bakery because potential lessees were intimidated and harmed
when they refused to give information regarding his
whereabouts."' Meza suggested Castillo-Arias go into hiding, and
leave for the U.S. as soon as he could.273 The Immigration Judge
in the original asylum hearing denied asylum because "the threat
to the Castillos was based on 'retaliation' or 'retribution' due to
Castillo-Arias' voluntary decision to be an informant against the
cartel" rather than on account of imputed political opinion, which
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.274
The crux of the case comes out of the BIA's discussion of
whether "noncriminal drug informants working against the Cali
drug cartel [can] constitute a 'particular social group' [under the
INA]., 275  The court reaffirmed the definition of 'a particular
social group' set forth in Matter of Acosta.z76 To the formulation
in Acosta, the BIA looked to the recent guidelines of UNHCR that
"combine elements of the Acosta immutable or fundamental
characteristic approach, as well as the Second Circuit's 'social
perception' approach., 277 The very act of being an informant was
one characterized by the BIA as being 'invisible' or as something
taking place out of the public view. "Recognizability or visibility
is limited to those informants who are discovered because they
appear as witnesses or otherwise come to the attention of cartel
members." '278
272 See Castillo-Arias, 446 F.3d. at 1192.
273 See id. at 1192. Meza himself fled for Spain. See id. at 1192, n.2. Castillo-
Arias' parents and two sisters fled to Germany. See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 953.
274 Castillo-Arias, 446 F.3d at 1192-93.
275 In re C-A-, 23 1 & N Dec. at 961.
276 See id. at 955. See discussion supra pp 482-93.
277 Id. at 956. The Second Circuit required that a voluntary associational
relationship be externally distinguishable. See Gomez v. I.N.S., 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d
Cir. 1991). See also supra note 259 for UNHCR guidelines concerning 'particular social
group.,
278 In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960. But see Perafan-Saldarriaga v. Gonzales, 402
F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2005). A DEA informant who was linked to another informant whose
cover was blown by a U.S media outlet and picked up by Colombian press was denied
his asylum claim on account of political opinion. See id. The court viewed his informant
actions as a self-serving attempt to remain in the U.S. rather than a politically motivated
action against the cartel. See id. The court did not address the matter of membership in
a particular social group, that group being his known ties to a DEA informant who was
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The BIA went on to address past experiences as an immutable
characteristic that would qualify for membership in a particular
social group. "A past experience is, by its very nature, immutable,
as it has already occurred and cannot be undone. However, that
does not mean that any past experience that may be shared by
others suffices to define a particular social group for asylum
purposes."'279 Referencing Matter of Fuentes, where persons
exposed to the risks associated with employment in police or
military occupations were not considered members of a social
group, the BIA analogized a person agreeing to work as a
government informant as someone who "takes a calculated risk
and is not in a position to claim refugee status should such risks
materialize."28 The BIA was further unmoved by the fact that
Castillo-Arias was not a paid informant, but acted out of a sense of
moral duty or civic obligation. The. court voiced concern that even
paid informants often act out of some sense of duty, many of
whom could "plausibly claim that their primary motivation was a
sense of civic duty and the compensation alone would not have
provided sufficient incentive to undertake the risks involved. 2 8
1
A concerning aspect of this case for all situations in Colombia
is the BIA's discussion of actions directed to the general
population. In this case, the Court specifically speaks of the Cali
Cartel and "other drug cartels" that direct harm against "anyone
and everyone perceived to have interfered with, or who might
present a threat to, their criminal enterprises. 282 The Court cites a
Department of State country report that indicated "[n]arcotics
traffickers frequently resorted to terror in attempts to intimidate
the Government and the general population".283  The court
concluded that it is therefore difficult to see any particular "group"
as being targeted by the cartels that is narrower than the general
population. This conclusion has grave implications for victims of
later murdered in Colombia. See id.
279 In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 958.
280 Id. at 958.
281 Id. at 959.
282 Id. at 960.
283 Id. at 960-61 (quoting Comm. On Foreign Affairs & Foreign Relations, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess., Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993, 393 (Joint
Comm. Print 1994)).
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guerrilla and paramilitary forces, whose attacks may seem
indiscriminant other than targeting those that get in their way.284
IV. Rediscovering Convention Purposes: Reformulating the
Nexus Requirements
An unfortunate legacy of Elias-Zacarias, as evidenced in the
review of Colombian decisions, is the narrowing of judicial review
of asylum cases. Although Congress has since codified the
285 tmstandard of review after Elias-Zacarias, at the time the new
requirement that successful appeals must demonstrate "that the
evidence not only supports [a] conclusion, but compels it '286 was
considered an extra-legal restriction on judicial review that was
seen as "rewriting the statute [and] overturning over 50 years of
settled case law., 287  Although Justice Scalia's "'compelling
evidence' standard" 288 only appeared in a note to a relatively short
opinion that never signaled its intention to change important
doctrine of judicial review,289 it has nevertheless resulted in
circuits now "describ[ing] an asylum-seeker's overall burden on
appeal in sweeping, restrictive language that appears all but
insurmountable., 290  Aside from how courts have restrictively
viewed the individual nexus grounds, this standard of review for
asylum decisions is particularly harmful in light of new BIA
284 See David A. Martin, Major Developments in Asylum Law over the Past Year, 83
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1889, 1894-95 (2006) (citing developments in Colombian
asylum claims specifically). See also Silva v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229 (1 1th Cir.
2006).
285 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2000) (stating that "the administrative findings of
fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
the contrary.").
286 I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992).
287 Deborah Anker, Carolyn P. Blum & Kevin Johnson, The Supreme Court's
Decision in INS v. Elias-Zacarias: Is There any "There" There?, 69 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 285, 291 (1992).
288 Stephen M. Knight, Article: Shielded from Review: The Questionable Birth and
Development of the Asylum Standard of Review Under Elias-Zacarias, 20 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 133, 133-34 (2005) (quoting Susan K. Kems, Country Conditions Documentation in
U.S. Asylum Cases: Leveling the Evidentiary Playing Field, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL.
STUD. 197, 212 (2000)).
289 See id. at 139.
290 Id. at 133. This statement was reinforced by the Eleventh Circuit's holding in
Silva v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229 (1 1th Cir. 2006). Discussed supra pp. 482-85.
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policies.291' Now that the BIA allows for "single-judge, single-
sentence affirmances without opinion . . . [where the BIA] no
longer performs its role as a formal appellate body and check on
immigration judge error," it has created a growing disaster that
threatens continued U.S. conformance with Convention
requirements.292 The first step towards ensuring U.S. compliance
with the 1951 Convention is to uniformly reject this unreasonable
restriction on judicial review that is contrary to administrative
review of other executive agencies.293
1. Political Opinion and Proving the Causal Connection
While the definition of what constitutes membership in a
particular social group is still rapidly evolving, the concepts of
what constitutes a political opinion are relatively settled.294
Neutrality and imputed political opinion have been accepted in
principle in a significant number of circuit courts.295  However,
with the exception of the Ninth Circuit, few cases have granted
relief based on these concepts.296 This trend is likely due more to a
failure in proving the causal link between the victim's plight and
the persecutor's intent rather than an unwillingness to recognize
the legal reality of neutrality and imputed political opinion.297
The 1980 Refugee Act represented the first in a long line of
restrictions the United States adopted that limited their duties
under the treaty without violating outright their treaty
obligations.298 Many commentators indicate that replacing the
original more passive version of the Convention's causal link, "for
reasons of," with "on account of' has created a focus on the
291 See id. at 152.
292 Id. at 152.
293 See id. at 151-52. The Supreme Court's decision in Elias-Zacarias spoke to
agency deference to findings of fact. For discussion of how fact-finding in the cross-
cultural context of asylum law presents special due process concerns. See Ilene Durst,
Article, Lost in Translation: Why Due Process Demands Deference to the Refugee's
Narrative, 53 RUTGERs L. REv. 127 (2000).
294 See, e.g., Durst, supra note 293.
295 See MUSALO ETAL., supra at 147, at 342-68.
296 See id.
297 See Shayna S. Cook, Repairing the Legacy of I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 23 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 223, 229-30 (2002).
298 See id. at 242.
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"persecutors' motive, rather than the refugee's predicament. '"2 99 In
turn, this shift in focus has led to proof problems in which a victim
must prove what was in the mind of her persecutor.3 °0 "[When]
the causal connection is between a Convention ground and the
applicant's well-founded fear ... the focus should ... be on the
applicant's predicament" and not on the motive of the
persecutor.30 ' Although INS v. Elias-Zacarias did not require
direct evidence of a persecutor's motives, courts have continued to
make this evidence a required element of any successful asylum
claim.30 2 As a result, proving the nexus requirement has been
more fatal to claims based on political opinion grounds than how
the ground itself has been interpreted. With regard to the nexus
requirement, courts have tended to draw on concepts rooted in
ascertaining criminal or civil liability, where courts would instead
do better to "[focus] on the object and purpose of the Convention,
which is concerned with providing international protection to
persons at serious risk of harm."30 3 To bring the United States
back in line with the purpose of the Convention, courts should
recognize that asylum adjudications are unique, as the rule of law
comes not from domestic legislation, but from international
treaty.304  When reading international treaties, courts should
interpret the treaty language in a broad manner rather than rely
exclusively on domestic legislation.30 5 Since the Convention itself
299 See id. (arguing that the difference in statutory language should not change U.S.
obligation under the Convention, where "[a]s a signatory to the Protocol, the United
States agreed to apply the Convention's non-derogable definition of a 'refugee').
300 See id. at 230-31.
301 UNHCR, Brief of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as
Amicus Curiae in the matter of Michelle Thomas et al, 15 (Jan. 2007).
302 See Cook supra note 297, at 232-33.
303 Michelle Foster, Causation in Contexts: Interpreting the Nexus Clause in the
Refugee Convention, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 265, 292 (2002). An example of causation
elements brought over from other areas is the "but for" test commonly seen in tort law.
See id. at 291-933. This test was used to deny the kinship claim of Londono. See
Londono v. U.S. Att'y Gen., No. 05-16249, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 27876, *12 (1lth
Cir. 2006).
304 See Foster, supra note 303, at 298, 334-35.
305 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
(stating that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations
if any other possible construction remains."). See also UNHCR in its amicus brief to the
BIA, discussed supra note 301. See, e.g., Grunfeder v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 503, 509 (9th
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did not establish a strict causation requirement, nor did it establish
that a Convention ground had to be a "central" or "essential" part
of an asylum claim, 30 6 any attempt to require otherwise is in
defiance of treaty obligations. Returning to the treaty's original
principles would allow the Convention to retain its relevance in
cases like Colombia, where it is often not a pure political motive
but a mixed motive that may include retaliation for non-
cooperation or financial motives such as extortion. "Current law
is in wide agreement that in a case where a persecutor has mixed
motives, a protected characteristic need only be one of the
motivations.,3 0' 7  The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, the central body responsible for interpreting the 1951
Convention, also supports this conclusion, stating "there is no
requirement in the Convention, Protocol, Handbook or Executive
Committee documents that one of the protected grounds be central
to the persecutor's motivation. ' 30 8  As a result, if an asylum
applicant is able to establish substantial evidence that a convention
factor was "one factor" or "in part" the motivation for his
persecution, the Convention requires that it suffice to establish the
nexus between his persecution and a Convention ground.3 9 To
demand more than the Convention requires is not only against the
spirit of the Refugee Convention, but also puts the U.S.
dangerously close to violating their duty as a member to the treaty.
2. Membership in a Particular Social Group
Attempts to define the membership in a particular social group
ground have been particularly strained, largely because of the oft
Cir. 1984) (finding that "[a]bsent an expression of congressional intent to the contrary,
considerations of courtesy and mutuality require our courts to construe domestic
legislation in a way that minimizes interference with the purpose or effect of foreign
law.").
306 See Foster, supra note 303, at 336-37.
307 Comments of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights on Proposed Rule INS.
NO. 2092-00; Att 'y Gen. ORDER NO. 2339-2000 Asylum and Withholding Definitions,
9, (Jan. 20, 2001), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/
gender_comments.pdf (citing case law supporting this analysis).
308 INS No. 2092-00, Comments on Proposed Rule Regarding Asylum and
Withholding Definitions of the UNHCR, Regional Office for the United States ofAmerica
and the Caribbean, Arr'Y GEN. ORDER NO. 2339-2000, at 7 (Jan. 22, 2001).
309 See Foster, supra note 304, at 337.
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expressed concern of 'opening the floodgates' in asylum claims
should the MPSG ground be construed too liberally.31° This
concern unnecessarily plagues courts' decisions as some worry
that if the ground is applied too broadly, membership in a
particular social group will effectively swallow up the other
grounds of asylum, and allow large classes of people to gain
access to asylum. 311 One commentator argues that the floodgates
concern is based on a misconception of membership in a particular
social group.3 12 She argues that "these same concerns apply
equally to other grounds" such as race and nationality,3 13 and yet
floodgate fears have not hindered development of legal doctrine
on those grounds. "[M]PSGs frequently encompass large groups,
but their size does not, by any means, require that all members of
the group receive asylum status.' 314 The other requirements of
asylum that form the nexus requirement "serve as significant
additional filters on eligibility for classification as a refugee and
for asylum eligibility."'3 15  Anker states the immutable
characteristic requirement for MPSGs keeps this ground from
becoming a 'catch-all' for asylum claims.316  While the
immutability requirement of an MPSG has been relatively settled,
recent confusion regarding a 'visibility' or 'social perception'
requirement has led to much recent debate.
When immutable traits are not readily identified, some argue
that the perception of society in defining the group is an important
component in establishing membership in a particular social
group.317 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dean of the Georgetown
310 See Deborah Anker, Membership in a Particular Social Group: Recent
Developments in U.S. Law, in 38th ANNUAL IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION INSTITUTE
119; 128 PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1514 (2005).
311 See id. at 127-28 (citing the "unfortunate Ninth Circuit decision [in] Sanchez
Trujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1996)").
312 See id. at 128 (stating that "[u]nderlying MPSG interpretive dilemmas, and
particularly inhibiting the development of gender-based MPSG jurisprudence, is a
concern that the MPSG ground necessarily embraces numerically large groups and will
allow an unmanageably high number of asylum claims.").
313 Id. at 128.
314 Id. at 124.
315 Id. at 124-25.
316 See Anker, supra note 310, at 128.
317 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Protected Characteristics and Social Perceptions:
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University Law Center and former General Counsel and Executive
Associate Commissioner for Programs at the I.N.S., argues that
while some traits may not establish themselves as fundamental or
immutable characteristics that bind a group, or traits that are
deemed "important or worthy," "the triviality, or not, of the shared
group characteristic ...ought not to be relevant for Convention
purposes ...As human history makes clear, persecutors choose
groups and victims for a variety of reasons, not simply based on
the fundamentality of the trait that defines the group."'
The UNHCR used Aleinikoff's arguments in formulating its
guidelines on social membership which were partially relied upon
in In re C-A-. As discussed, the BIA excerpted one paragraph in
the UNHCR's Guidelines on International Protection that seems to
give the court a means of determining, in the absence of an
established and recognized social group, that groups whose only
shared characteristic appears to be "their risk of being persecuted"
will not qualify as a social group for purposes of protection under
the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol.319  This threshold
constitutes a potentially dangerous limitation that might allow
courts to avoid the complex work of determining what qualifies as
membership in a particular social group by simply concluding the
only cohesive factor is their risk of persecution. The effect is
making it all too easy for the court to dismiss the application of the
ground entirely. However, when the court is willing to conduct a
thorough analysis of the immutable characteristics set forth by an
applicant, it can reach a positive result for all involved.
The Tapiero case indicates what can result through a thorough
analysis of immutable characteristics. In this case, the court found
that "educated, wealthy, landowning, cattle-farming Colombians"
were established as members of a particular social group meeting
the Acosta test precisely because of a nuanced understanding of
Colombian society.3 0 The judge noted evidence showing that this
privileged class was among the FARC's preferred victims not
An Analysis of the Meaning of 'Membership of a Particular Social Group', in REFUGEE
PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 263, 294-300 (Erika Feller, Volker Turk & Frances
Nicholson eds. 2003).
318 Id. at 299-300.
319 See In re C-A-, 23 I & N Dec. 951 (BIA 2006). See generally UNHCR
Guidelines, supra note 256, at 3.
320 See Tapiero de Orejuela v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 666, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2005).
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merely because of their wealth, but because of their education and
their attendant "social position as cattle farmers." '321 "A particular
characteristic that defines a social group within a society such as
education, manner of speech, or profession may be more mutable
than one's race, ethnicity, or religion, but these traits are
nevertheless distinguishing markers within a given society that are
not easily changed or hidden."3"' This case was decided before In
re C-A-, so any confusion that C-A- has contributed to MPSG
analysis was not a factor in this case. However, there is growing
support for a determination that the BIA got their analysis of the
MPSG ground completely wrong in In re C-A-.
In an amicus brief submitted in an appeal to the BIA, the
UNHCR took issue with the BIAs interpretation of their guidelines
regarding the MPSG ground.323  The DHS attorneys were
interpreting In re C-A- as establishing a new dual requirement for
the MPSG ground, adding to the "immutable or fundamental"
requirement established in Acosta a "social visibility" requirement
under C-A-.324 The UNHCR firmly rebukes this understanding,
stating that their guidelines, which the BIA used in adopting C-A-,
represent alternate requirements, not dual requirements.325 "This
secondary analysis for cognizable groups applies only where the
social group trait is not immutable and would not be needed in the
case of a social group based in whole or part on a "protected
characteristic." '326 Further, support for this analysis can be found
elsewhere in the UNHCR Guidelines that was not cited by the BIA
in their determination in C-A-. "[I]f a claimant alleges a social
group that is based on a characteristic determined to be neither
unalterable or fundamental, further analysis should be undertaken
to determine whether the group is nonetheless perceived as a
cognizable group in that society." '327 This section was relied upon
in a House of Lords decision in the UK regarding membership in a
321 Id. at 672.
322 Id. at 672.
323 See UNHCR, Brief of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as
Amicus Curiae in the matter of Michelle Thomas et al (Jan. 2007).
324 See id. at 7.
325 See id. at 6-7.
326 Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
327 UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 259, at no. 13 (emphasis added).
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particular social group, which stated "that persecutory action
towards a group may be a relevant factor in determining the
visibility of a group in a particular society. ' 328
Although some scholars have suggested that the visibility
element of the In re C-A- decision "appear[ed] to be on more solid
ground, 3 29 the UNHCR put that determination to rest by further
clarifying its definition of "social perception."33  The UNHCR
stated that it does not follow that a group must be visible to society
at large for a group to be perceived as such in society.Y' "[T]he
members of a group need not be easily recognizable to the general
public in order for the group as a whole to be perceived by society
as a particular social group. '3 2 As an example, UNHCR cites
homosexuals in Cuba. Individual homosexuals may not be visible
to the general public, yet social ostracism of the group as a whole
has led to their establishment as a particular social group under
asylum law.333 With this clarification, it may still be that non-
criminal drug cartel informants would not qualify under the
Convention as a particular social group. However it is clear that
the decision in In re C-A- should not be read as requiring visibility
to qualify as a particular social group.
Therefore the decision in In re C-A- may have been
shortsighted in failing to recognize that it may indeed be the
persecutory action against a group that makes them a particular
social group for purposes of asylum if the targeting of the group
helps to establish the group identity when no immutable trait is
readily apparent. This is an important distinction, and the BIA has
an opportunity to correct their holding in In re C-A- when deciding
this appeal.
328 K v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, [2006] UKHL 46, [2007] 1 A.C.
412, 432 (House of Lords). A decision in which UNHCR also submitted a brief, stating
"The question to be established is whether the particular social group is "cognizable " as
a group, viewed objectively in terms of the relevant society ... [as] "set apart, " for
cultural, social, religious, or legal factors." UNCHR Brief, supra note 324, at 8.
329 Martin, supra note 284, at 1894 (citing Second Circuit precedent and the
UNHCR guidelines as support).
330 See UNHCR Brief, supra note 323, at 9.
331 See id. at 9.
332 Id. at 9.
333 See id. at 9 (citing Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 1. & N. Dec. 819 (BIA 1990)).
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V. Conclusion
"Colombians now constitute a high percentage of asylum
claimants... [and] reported judicial cases often include, as in In re
C-A-, rejection of claims that are quite sympathetic, and several
circuits have approved narrow doctrine that could result in
excluding many Colombians from protection." '334 However, it is
clear that protection is available under the Convention for victims
of non-state actors and areas of generalized violence if the asylum
construct is allowed to return to its original formulation under the
Convention.
In answering the central question of whether the Convention is
still relevant in addressing the needs of today's victims of
persecution, the answer is yes. Although the Convention has been
criticized for its "vagueness and manipulability of one of its key
provisions, the refugee definition," '335 its ability to adapt to the
changing requirements of protection is also its core strength. The
Convention itself can respond to protect those displaced by civil
war and armed insurgency, but only if the Convention itself is
protected. We must not allow "[n]ational authorities [to] have
discretion to tighten the criteria of eligibility, either consciously
and visibly for deterrent aims, surreptitiously, or even in
subconscious reaction to fears of opening floodgates." '336
In the end, the political dimension of asylum is not so different
from the humanitarian conception of asylum, for after all both
views have at their origin in the 1951 Convention. If the United
States could return to the original concept of the 1951 Convention
and 1967 Protocol, discarding the increasingly restrictive case law
that has threatened to place the United States in violation of its
obligations under the treaty, the expressive practice of asylum as a
political conception could merge with the humanitarian conception
of asylum. By returning to the spirit and letter of the Convention,
the United States would not need the 'new' system of asylum
proponents of the humanitarian conception advocate to address the
special challenges internal conflict creates.
334 Martin, supra note 284, at 1894 (2006) (citing Silva v. Att'y Gen., 448 F.3d
1229 (11 th Cir. 2006)).
335 Joan Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS.
J. 229, 232 (1996).
336 Id. at 242.
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The United States has a moral obligation to expand its
interpretation of the Convention to bring its jurisprudence back
into compliance with the treaty. In addition, expanding its
interpretation would constitute both a humanitarian and political
response to the human rights crisis in Colombia, a crisis the United
States continues to play a significant role in creating.337
Our current system of asylum does not adequately address
these concerns, not because the Convention itself is obsolete but
because U.S. interpretation of the Convention has threatened
compliance with it. Floodgate concerns continue to be
exaggerated given the complex formula one must meet to be
granted asylum, and implementing the changes suggested above
will not make asylum a 'catch-all' for migrants motivated by non-
persecutory purposes. Current anti-immigration sentiment should
not be allowed to shirk our duties as parties to the Convention, or
as a responsible actor in our own hemispheric affairs.
Implementing changes that preserve asylum as a special
''expressive" practice but that also recognize the realities of
internal conflict are appropriate measures to satisfy our obligation
and reclaim our status as a credible moral authority in the realm of
international human rights.
ELIZABETH A. JAMES
337 See discussion supra pp.468-72.
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